Ⅵ In many cases, standards have public goods attributes. As a result it is important to consider how the development costs are provided. It is well known that public goods, due to their nonexclusionary nature, are subject to free riders. We consider free-ridership in standardization in general, and examine the case of one standard, IEEE 802.3i (10BaseT) in particular. We show that free-ridership existed in the development of the 10BaseT standard, and in the subsequent product market, by specifying the criteria for the existence of free-ridership and by providing the necessary data to show that such an issue actually exists. We discuss the consequences of free-ridership and consider the implications for the standards development process in general.
dard find that their benefits from developing the standard cannot justify their costs, then rationally-behaving companies lose their incentive to produce more such standards in the future.
The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) sponsors the development of standards, along with numerous other organizations. The IEEE is a professional society that develops standards to advance the profession; it has been accredited to develop national standards by the American National Standards Institute. Beginning in the early 1980s and continuing to the present, the IEEE Computer Society undertook the development of Local Area Network (LAN) standards in its 802 Committee. This committee later became a framework for the development of several specific LAN standards, such as 802.3 for CSMA/CD (Ethernet) and 802.5 for Token Ring.
The IEEE has a standards process similar to those used by other standards-developing organizations. However, as a user organization that is committed to the advancement of electrical and electronics engineering theory and practice, each member represents himself or herself and does not necessarily represent their corporate employers, although in practice they frequently do.
Free Riders, Public Goods, and Standards Development
We develop the concepts of free ridership and public goods in more detail and apply it to the productdevelopment process. We will use these general concepts in subsequent sections to examine the 10BaseT standard in more detail.
FREE RIDERS
Heyne [1991] describes "free riders" as "people who accept the benefits of a public good without paying their share of the cost of providing those benefits." In the extreme case, if no one has an incentive to pay the costs of a collective good, then the collective good will not be provided. Thus, many people are worse off because the benefits provided by the collective good will not be provided. However, if a few people pay the costs of a collective good, then everyone will gain from the benefits. Rational people or firms will make that investment only if the returns on that investment are adequate [Olson 1971] . If the benefits to a minority are not large enough for them to undertake the investment privately but the benefits to society as a whole are large, then government may step in and coerce people to contribute through taxes or user fees.
More generally, Olson [1971] points out that free riders disrupt the system of providing public goods by causing a suboptimal amount of a collective good to be provided. He describes this problem as an improper distribution of a public good, that is, public goods are under-provided because it may not be in the interest of any one company to provide the public good.
PUBLIC GOODS
Public goods typically have the property of nonexcludability; that is, it is impossible or difficult to exclude people from using the good once it is provided. This is the case with standards. Once a standard is developed, it is effectively in the public domain. In order for the standard to be successful, people have to use it. To facilitate its use, the details of the standard have to be widely available. Under those circumstances, it becomes difficult for the developers of the standard to recover the cost of its development. 3 For privately provided public goods, free riders are those firms that take advantage of the public good without contributing to its provision; they must therefore be willing to take the benefits of a public good exactly as it is provided by the developers. They cannot dictate how these benefits will be given or what the nature of the public good will be, so an incentive exists for free riders to participate in providing it.
For standards, we define free riders as those manufacturing firms that develop and subsequently sell products conforming to the standard without having participated actively in its development. 4 In particular, we can define two types of free-ridership that may occur in the standards-development process. Type 1 free-ridership occurs when a firm chooses not to participate in the standards-development process in any way and is content to wait until the standard is complete, or nearly complete, before developing products. This type of free-ridership is most easily observed in the market because one can simply compare the attendance list of the standards committee with the marketplace participants. A form of free-ridership that is more difficult to detect is Type 2 freeridership, where a firm sends representatives to the committee meetings, but only for the purpose of observation and education. They do not participate actively in the process beyond observation. Type 2 free riders are content to allow the other firms to spend their resources to develop the technology, but they wish to stay informed of the process. Effectively, these firms do not care what the outcome of the process is (as long as it works); they wish to be the first-to-market with products that conform to this standard. Concord Data Systems was a Type 2 free rider in the development of the V.22 and V.32 modem standards [Weiss 1991] . 5 3 Weiss and Spring [1992] argue that U.S. intellectual property laws provide only weak protection to standards, making recoveries based on intellectual property grounds difficult. 4 This manufacturer-oriented definition is not the only one that could be used. If we were to consider the life cycle of standards, many interested parties, such as users, government agencies, etc., would have to be considered. A manufactureroriented definition makes sense for examining 10BaseT because it is a product standard, so it will be adopted here. 5 The case of Concord Data Systems is particularly interesting because they were the first to market with V.22bis and V.32 modem products. In an interview (July 6, 1993) , Ken Miller, then president of Concord Data Systems, confirmed CDS's role in these modem standards as observers of the activity, but pointed out that Concord Data Systems was very active in the development of subsequent enhancements to the V.32 modem standard. This indicates that firms may free ride on some standards and not on others, depending on the strategic importance of the standard to the firm. Table One summarizes the costs and benefits to standards developing firms and Type 1 free riders as a result of their respective decisions. Type 2 free riders incur the travel costs but gain advance information about the technical content of the standard. It is clearly rational for a firm to elect to develop a standard in some cases and to free-ride in others, depending on the cost and benefit calculus.
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FREE-RIDERSHIP
Developers (defined as those who are neither Type 1 nor Type 2 free riders) incur the bulk of the costs of the standards development. These companies, along with Type 2 free riders, meet at various locations around the world to develop, discuss, and understand the draft standards. There are both direct and opportunity costs associated with this phase of the standards-development lifecycle. The direct costs to the company include travel, lodging, meeting attendance, dues, administrative costs of developing drafts, and salary and time of the standards delegates. The opportunity costs include constraints placed by the standard on product specifications and lost market share to free riders that gain access to the market.
Most firms attend the standards meetings in order to negotiate a direction for the standard that will favor their technical or technological strengths, or their strategic direction. Weiss and Sirbu [1990] consider the dilemma that negotiators within the standards meetings face. Often, several proprietary technical components are offered as alternatives in developing a standard, each component may favor a different firm. In this case, the costs and benefits for each of the different options must be considered before making a decision about which alternative to choose. The lowest cost option may not always be the best one.
The firms developing a voluntary consensus standard incur many of the same costs as the firm that develops an internal standard. Toth [1990] breaks down the internal standards-development costs into investment costs, running costs, and revision costs. Investment costs include establishing consensus, publishing drafts, distributing drafts, announcing the new standard, and holding seminars on it. Running costs include interpreting the standard's details, advising on applications, developing additional sources of supply, resolving problems between suppliers and manufacturing management, monitoring technological changes, and keeping current with new technologies. Revision costs include incorporating all corrections into the standard, adding materials, making changes, and updating references to other standards. Toth also considers the following tangible costs of an internal standards-development process: documenting the standards action, monitoring and participating in the external standards, and increasing the marginal costs of each unit to cover the costs of standards development.
Another important cost incurred by many standards-developing companies is the salary and the time of the standards delegate. Many companies hire standards engineers to work full-time on developing standards, but others send their senior engineers to the standards meetings to negotiate on their behalf. The company must send senior engineers to the standards meetings because many of the discussions tend to be highly technical-a nontechnical delegate may not be as effective in negotiating for the company.
Opportunity Costs to Developers. Another important cost of standardization is the loss of opportunity to produce new and innovative products. David [1992] states that one of the opportunity costs incurred when developing a universal standard is the possible stifling of innovative processes and new approaches to problem solving. But standardization does not remove all innovation from products, as each product still contains differentiation and valueadded features that make it distinctive. As most of the design work is completed after a universal standard has been developed, the research and development activities of a firm that implements the standard would focus on incremental modifications for valueadded product features, but would not produce radically new solutions for solving the same problem. Toth [1990] details some of the specific ways in which research and development activities may fail to provide innovative solutions: freedom of choice constraints, restriction of design innovations, constraints placed by single solutions to different problems, differentiation loss in products.
Benefits to Developers. Active developers can lobby for technologies that are favorable to them [1990], which can give a production advantage in the near term. This can also result in royalties and licensing fees if patented or copyrighted technologies are included in the standard [Weiss and Spring 1992] .
Advance notice of product specifications is a benefit to both vendors and users, allowing early market entry and the opportunity to profit from leading-edge users. This advantage disappears with Type 2 free riders.
Costs to Free Riders. Type 1 free riders are not concerned with direct costs because they do not pay to develop the standard. Instead, they simply purchase the standard that defines important aspects of the product, and then develop their product. Sometimes these companies can add innovative features, and at the same time remain within specifications of the standard. Thus, they achieve both compatibility and added value and manufacture a product that could be superior to that of the original manufacturer (i.e., developer).
Type 1 free riders have to catch up with early products (manufactured by the standard's developers); this is an opportunity cost to them. The cost could be high, with very little payback, depending on the size of the market and the time it takes free riders to enter the market. The costs include time and money, and may also include additional research and development costs to create a product more innovative, or less costly, than the earlier one.
Benefits to Free Riders. The primary benefit gained by free riders is the savings in avoiding the standards-development process. As we show, this can be a significant cost savings (depending on the level of involvement). Another important benefit to the free-riding companies is reducing the risk of losing money by developing products for an "orphaned" technology. Free-riding companies reduce this risk because they are able to observe the viability and dynamics of the market prior to entering it. Developers, however, make an implicit commitment to manufacture products before a market exists; hence they assume greater risk.
FREE-RIDERSHIP: SOCIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS
To this point, we have assumed that free-ridership is undesirable. The argument in support of this case can be summarized as follows:
(1) Firms invest privately to provide a public good.
(2) If free-ridership is a problem, firms may choose to under-invest in standards because by doing so they give their free-riding competitors a cost advantage in the subsequent market for compatible products (especially Type II free riders). (3) This is socially undesirable because standards are a necessary infrastructure for information systems. (4) Underinvestment in voluntary consensus standards would be accompanied by an increased investment in de facto standards for those interfaces that need to be standardized based on their inherent characteristics.
(5) De facto standards often result in market rivalry between competing technologies. In principle, one standard "wins," leaving those manufacturers and users that backed losing standards worse off; as they are now forced to switch.
This argument does not capture the true social costs of developing a standard. It is well known in political theory that divergent preferences result in either unstable outcomes (i.e., the group's decision depends on the voting dynamics, instead of a well-defined collective preference) or costly consensus (i.e., it requires more time and, perhaps, more concessions on the part of the winning coalition to achieve consensus). Thus, by staying away from the committee, Type I free riders may actually contribute to a standard-in that it might be achieved more quickly or with fewer compromises. Type II free riders generally do not take an active position in the committee debate. If their interest lies more in achieving a standard, regardless of the technical content, then they are more likely to vote with the majority, as a vote with the majority would meet their objective. Minority positions might be abandoned more quickly in the presence of a large alternative majority, which could accelerate the development of the standard. Consequently, Type II free riders can contribute to the completion of the standard under some circumstances by amplifying the size of the majority (much as the Electoral College votes in U.S. Presidential elections amplify the difference in the popular vote), and, free-ridership in general can contribute to the development of a widely accepted standard in an indirect way.
Free Riders and the 10BaseT Standard
As we discussed above, Type 1 free-ridership exists when there is at least one 10BaseT product manufacturer who did not attend committee meetings. Although this is the coarsest measurement of free-ridership, it is also the most easily measured. If there are more 10BaseT product manufacturers than there are standard developing companies, then Type 1 free-ridership exists in the market for 10BaseT products. The next question that a pragmatic policy analysts would ask is whether the problem is significant. This is more difficult, relying as it does on arbitrary thresholds such as market share percentages.
TYPE 1 FREE-RIDERSHIP
In identifying the existence of Type 1 free-ridership, Toyofuku [1993] found 245 companies listed in the Computer Select "Hardware Specifications" database that sold 10BaseT products in 1992. He calculated the number of firms based on a list of the working group members (published with the IEEE 802.3 10BaseT standard) and the 1989 and 1990 IEEE Membership Directories (needed to identify the employers of the participants). 6 From the data, he estimated that 71 companies sponsored attendance at the IEEE 10BaseT task force meetings. The number of companies producing 10BaseT products in 1991 was much larger than the number of companies that helped develop the standard by sending delegates to the meetings. Therefore, we conclude that Type 1 free-ridership exists.
SIGNIFICANCE OF TYPE 1 FREE-RIDERSHIP
This opens the question of the significance of Type 1 free-ridership to standards developers. We define significance as impacting future standards-development activities; that is, if free-ridership is significant, one or more developers would alter their participation in the development of future standards because they do not receive sufficient returns on their investment. As this is difficult to measure without inside information, we propose that any of the following criteria could be used to empirically determine whether free-ridership is a significant issue:
(1) When there are more free-riding companies than nonfree ones that helped develop the standard. This is a simple but not obviously reasonable criterion, since it is not weighted by sales. If the developers were in the minority, but sold the majority of products, then the developers would likely not consider the free-ridership a problem. (2) When free-riding companies take up a significant portion of the market (above a certain threshold level, say 20%). This measure solves the problem of the unweighted criterion, but it remains a gross measure that might be felt by the developers as a group, but not individually. Since the decision to participate is made individually (not collectively) by firms, it is not clear that this measure is particularly useful. The threshold level of 20% is arbitrary, but could be refined based on further empirical studies. (3) When a major player in the market (one company with a market share greater than a certain threshold, say 10%) does not participate in the development of the standard. This is similar in many respects to the foregoing measure, in that it addresses the group of developers as a whole. Instead of aggregating the free riders, it considers only the most successful ones. This criterion suffers from the same problems as the previous one.
(4) When the combined market share for all free riders exceeds the market share of a developer. This measure is more refined than the others, since it attempts to consider the impact felt by a single firm that participated in the development of the standard. Here the free riders are aggregated and compared to one developer. A single firm may not directly perceive this because their competition is potentially dispersed across many firms. Since they are not consistently losing business to one competitor, free-ridership may not appear as significant as it really is. This measure also has the advantage of not being tied to an arbitrary threshold. (5) When the market share of a free rider exceeds the market share of a developer. This criterion has the advantages of the previous one, except that free riders are considered individually, not in aggregate. Thus, it might be the best measure of benefits lost. It is also the most stringent of the criteria considered here.
With each of these criteria, the time of measurement is important, and the type of standard may be important. Time of measurement is important because a firm can easily consider the investment in developing a standard like any other type of investment: it must have a benefit that exceeds the internal rate of return, otherwise it is not an economic investment. This return would be calculated over some period, but would most likely be in the early phases of the product market. 7 Thus, it may be less of an issue that free riders dominate a market five years after a standard was developed than that a free rider dominates the market immediately after the standard was approved. In the former case, the developers would likely perceive that they have earned an adequate return on their investment in the development of the standard so they would not be concerned with free riders. In the latter case, the free-ridership is more critical, because one of the important benefits of participation is an early marketplace advantage. The type of standard is also important. The 10BaseT standard could be considered a "product" standard, along with modem standards, personal computer standards, and so forth, in that it is geared toward defining the essential features of a product in a market. Other standards, such as the OSI standards and ISDN standards have been considered "anticipatory" [Bernt and Weiss 1993] , in that they were developed well in advance of a product market, or could not be defined by a single consumer product 6 As a professional organization, the IEEE develops standards to advance the profession, and lists the working group members, and not their employers; hence the need for cross-referencing the working group membership. This assumes that the working group members represented their employers-which need not be the case. Toyofuku's [1993] list of companies was confirmed by a document from Ms. Pat Thaler, then Chairperson of the 10BaseT working group and currently Chair of the IEEE 802.3 committee.
7 While this need not be the case, a firm that actively develops a standard probably has a near-term application for it. If they do not, then either their participation is not rational, or is made for strategic reasons. For a product standard like 10BaseT, it is likely that the near-term market potential drove the development of the standard, not the strategic reasons. For other standards, such as ISDN and OSI protocols, the strategic factors probably dominated, particularly as the markets for these products remain weak despite intensive development over long periods of time. (like an NIC or hub). Free-ridership in anticipatory standards may be measured by different significance criteria than product standards. The criteria above focus on product standards.
Toyofuku [1993] collected 1991 market share data 8 for 10BaseT Ethernet hubs and network interface cards (NIC), the two critical components of a 10BaseT network 9 (the structure of a 10BaseT network is shown in Figure One) . He found that Cabletron and SynOptics were clearly the leaders in the market for hubs with a 25% and 23% stake, respectively. Hewlett-Packard also captured a significant portion of the hub market with an 8% share. In the NIC market, the leaders were 3Com, Racal-Datacom, and SMC with a 22%, 21%, and 12% stake in the market, respectively. Also significant is the market share captured by the "other" manufacturers. Manufacturers of Ethernet hubs listed as "other" captured 44% of the market, while the market share of manufacturers of Ethernet network interface cards listed as "other" was 45%. Unfortunately, more precise data is not available.
Toyofuku [1993] interviewed Pat Thaler, the chairman of the 10BaseT Task Force, during the development of the standard, to identify the level of involvement in the standard by the major players in the 10BaseT market. Ms. Thaler stated that 3Com, Standard Micro-systems Corporation (SMC), 10 RacalDatacom, Cabletron, SynOptics, and Hewlett-Packard were present for all of the meetings. How-ever, she noted that 3Com, SMC, and Racal-Datacom tended to be "backseat players," compared to the "active players" (AT&T, National Semiconductor, and AMD) that frequently presented their ideas on how the standard should be developed.
All of the major players in the 10BaseT market, including 3Com, Racal-Datacom, Standard Microsystems Corporation, Cabletron, SynOptics, and HewlettPackard, attended the 10BaseT standard meetings. However, even though the major players were all involved in the development of the standard, it is possible that some of the significance criteria discussed above apply. As noted, there is approximately a 45% market share of "other manufacturers" and there were only 71 companies that attended the 10BaseT meetings. Thus, there are 171 "free-riding" companies that captured part of the 45% market share of "other" companies.
Note that National Semiconductor and AMD, two of the key developers cited by Ms. Thaler, are both primarily producers of integrated circuits. 11 Thus, a more complete analysis of free-ridership should consider the factor market; that is, as suppliers of specialized integrated circuits to NIC and hub manufacturers as well. The data on the use of specialized ICs by NIC and hub manufacturers was not available, and so was not included.
Consider the extent to which the significance criteria apply in this case. Clearly Criterion 1 applies, but has the difficulties discussed above. Criteria 2 and 3 may apply, depending on the thresholds. It is possible to estimate significance based on Criterion 4, given the available data, by making the simplifying assumption that, on average, all of the "other" companies had equal market shares. 12 Since there were 245 companies selling 10BaseT hubs and network interface cards, 13 there were 239 "other" companies (245 -3 -3) , that make up the other 45% of the market not occupied by the market leaders. 14 Under the uniform market share assumption, each of these vendors had a 0.2% share of the market (45%/239). 15 The percentage of the market that belonged to free riders can be determined by calculating the market share of the developers and subtracting that from the 45% market share of "other" companies. The market share of the developers is the market share for each of the "other" companies (0.2%), multiplied by the number of developers, excluding the major players for both the hub and the network interface card market (71 -3 -3 = 65). Thus, the "other" market share attributable to developers (under the uniform market share assumption) is 13% (65 T 0.2%). It follows that the market share of free riders, with the assumptions listed above, is 32% (45%/13%). Since this 32% market share was greater than the market share of any major player selling 10BaseT products in 1991 (two years after the approval of the standard), free-ridership was significant by Criterion 4 as well.
DEVELOPMENT COSTS OF 10BASET
Another estimate that can be calculated is the total cost of developing the standard. The tangible cost, which actually underestimates the total cost, can be broken down into travel and engineering costs. In an interview, Don Loughry 16 (then chairman of the 802.3 Committee and now chairman of the 802 Committee) stated that the 10BaseT standard took 24 meetings to develop-most of which took place in the U.S. (two or three meetings took place in Europe), and that each meeting was attended by 50 to 75 people.
According to the survey reported by Toyofuku [1993] , the least amount spent for travel and lodging by any of the companies responding to a survey mailed to 10BaseT members was $4200 (for three people to attend one meeting) and the highest amount spent by one company was $42,000 (for one person to attend six meetings). From the limited results of this survey, we estimate that a U.S.-based meeting would cost an average of $1500 for travel and lodging per attendee. The time the employee and the development team spend must still be accounted for to obtain a reasonable cost estimate.
To estimate the salary of an engineer, an hourly wage must first be determined. We begin by assuming that a typical engineer in the late 1980s earned an annual salary of $80,000 (for an hourly wage of approximately $40). Since benefits and overhead must be included in addition to this salary, we use an hourly wage estimate of $80. The survey indicates that a typical company representative spends 72 hours in connection with one 10BaseT standards meeting, which means the total cost of the representative's time in connection with the standards meeting was $80 T 72 hours = $5760.
Thus, the total cost per meeting per representative was $7260. Given that each meeting had 50 to 75 attendees, the total cost per meeting can be estimated to lie between $363,000 and $545,000. Since there were 24 meetings, the total cost of developing the 10BaseT standard was between $8.7 million and $13 million. Thus, the average company spent between $125,000 and $185,000 to support the development of 10BaseT. The companies that actually did much of the development work (AT&T, National Semiconductor, and AMD, according to Pat Thaler) probably spent much more, and Type 2 free riders probably spent less. If we assume that Type 2 free riders who intended to build 10BaseT products would wish to attend every meeting in order to stay informed, but would minimize their costs by sending only one person, the total expenditure for these firms would be approximately $174,000.
Discussion
Our results suggest the need to consider equity in funding the standards-development process. Clearly, a minority of the firms are spending significant sums to support the development of standards. As long as these developers perceive benefits, free-ridership will not be a problem. (The funding question was taken up in more detail by Spring and Weiss [1994] ).
Our data indicates that free-ridership could escalate into a problem because the free riders collectively had a market share larger than one of the developers. A potentially larger problem appears to be Type 2 free riders-those who attend meetings but do not actively contribute to the content of the standard. While developers have an advantage over Type 1 free riders, in that they have early and detailed knowledge of the standard, they do not have this advantage over Type 2 free riders. The only remaining advantage could be in having a technology favorable to them adopted in the standard and by possibly being able to collect royalties and licensing fees.
12 This assumption is somewhat problematic, in that it might be more reasonable to assume that the market shares are, in fact, exponentially decreasing. If they are exponentially decreasing, it becomes important to know what the rate of decrease is (i.e., the exponent) and where the participants and free riders are positioned with respect to each other. Lacking these data, we simply make the uniform assumptions. 13 The Computer Select database actually lists the number of vendors of products. Some of these vendors might have Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) relationships with manufacturers of NICs or hubs, so the number of actual manufacturers might well be lower. The available data are not sufficiently detailed to allow this distinction, so we assume that all 245 vendors are actually manufacturers. 14 For both NICs and hubs, the market share of "other" manufacturers was about 45%, so we lump them together. These advantages may be weaker than their marketplace advantage over Type 1 free riders. 17 So how should the standards process be funded? While a detailed analysis of this complex question is outside our scope here, we suggest that more equitable approaches exist. For example, one can imagine a fee levied on all products, to reimburse developers for at least a fraction of their investment. 18 This would encourage developers to become more active in the standards-development process, because their monetary benefits would then be enhanced. One can imagine ANSI employing professional standards developers, like the model used by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [Bernt and Weiss 1993] . One can also imagine a more prominent role for government.
Conclusion and Future Research
Type 1 free-ridership in the market for 10BaseT products was established by comparing the number of companies that produced 10BaseT products with the number of companies that helped to pay for its development, by sending delegates to the standards meetings. However, it is still uncertain whether the problem of free-ridership is serious. All of the companies with significant market share in the 10BaseT market of hubs and network interface cards were involved in the development of the 10BaseT standard, so we might conclude that the free-ridership issue is not a serious problem (based on Criterion 1). Yet our calculations show that the total market share captured by all "free riders," as a group, dominated the market share of any single firm, including the market leader (based on Criterion 4). While this criterion is not the best available for assessing the significance of free-ridership, it does indicate that free-ridership may be a significant problem, so that developers of the 10BaseT standard might be deterred from actively participating in standards development in the future. The response to Toyofuku's [1993] survey was inadequate to determine whether this was actually the case among the developers. Better empirical results could be obtained if more detailed market share data were available over time and if the participation patterns of the developers could be observed in post-10BaseT standards committees.
Identifying Type 2 free-ridership is more difficult ex post. There is some evidence, based on the interview with the 10BaseT task force chair, that it was present among the marketplace leaders; that is, some of the leaders did not participate actively in the development. Further analysis is necessary to determine the extent of Type 2 free-ridership and its significance. sv 17 For product standards like 10BaseT, much of the technological advantage lies in the ability to produce NICs and hubs at low cost or with value-added features. Much of the technical details of the standard, especially in this case, is contained in relatively standard integrated circuits, which explains the prominent role of AMD, a chip manufacturer, in 10BaseT. Firms whose patented or copyrighted technology is incorporated into a standard are obliged to license freely and fairly, implying that this effort would not be undertaken as a way to increase royalty revenue. 
